Abstract. We do a quantitative analysis of modal logic. For example. for each Kripke structure M , we study the least ordinal , u such that for each state of M , the beliefs up to level ,u characterize the agents' beliefs (that is, there is only one way to extend these beliefs to higher levels). As another example, we show the equivalence of three conditions, that on the face of it look quite different, for what it means to say that the agents' beliefs have a countable description, or putting it another way, have a "countable amount of information". The first condition says that the beliefs of the agents are those at a state of a countable Kripke structure. The second condition says that the beliefs of the agents can be described in an infinitary language. where conjunctions of arbitrary countable sets of formulas are allowed. The third condition says that countably many levels of belief are sufficient to capture all of the uncertainty of the agents (along with a technical condition). The fact that all of these conditions are equivalent shows the robustness of the concept of the agents' beliefs having a "countable description".
location counter. In temporal logic a possible world is just a point in time [BurSO] . In the analysis of distributedsystems. a possible world is just a global state [Ha187] , which gives the local state of each of the processes. But in applications where it is not clear what a possible world is, e.g., in epistemic logic, how can we construct a Kripke structure without understanding its basic constituents?
For these reasons, Fagin, Halpern, and Vardi [FHV91] defined knowledge structures, and Fagin and Vardi [FV85] defined the slightly more general modal structures, as an alternative to Kripke structures. (Similar structures were suggested by van Emde Boas et al. [EGSSO] and Mertens and Zamir [MZSS] .) These structures are defined in a hierarchical fashion. At the bottom, or 0th level, is a truth assignment, which can be thought of as a state of nature. The next level describes each agent's beliefs about nature, which corresponds to a set of truth assignments. Intuitively, these are the states of nature that the agent considers possible. The ( k + 1)st-order belief of each agent is modeled by a set of possibilities, each of which is a description of a state of nature and each agent's kth-order belief. Intuitively, whatever is in the subset is believed to be possible, and whatever is not in the subset is believed to be impossible. A modal structure consists of a state of nature and each agent's hierarchy of beliefs.
Modal structures can be viewed as "modal worlds" of length o. It turns out [FHVgl] that there are situations where this hierarchy of w levels is not sufficient to capture all of the uncertainty of the agents; it is necessary to extend the hierarchy to levels w , o + 1, and beyond. Fagin, Geanakoplos, Halpern, and Vardi [FGHV92] investigated this situation. They defined what it means for the first w levels to characterize the agents' beliefs (that is, to uniquely determine all higher levels), and they gave necessary and sufficient conditions. Not surprisingly, there is a natural correspondence (first discussed in [FHV9 I]) between a state of a Kripke structure on the one hand, and a modal world on the other hand. Specifically, for each ordinal 1 and each state s of a Kripke structure M , there is a unique modal world of length A that represents state s of M . Intuitively, this world represents the beliefs of the agents up to level A at state s of M . In this paper, we shall investigate this correspondence carefully and thereby obtain certain quantitative features of both Kripke structures and modal worlds.
Much is known about the qualitative effect of graph-theoretic assumptions about a Kripke structure. For example, it is well known that by assuming that the graph represents an equivalence relation, we obtain properties corresponding to the modal logic S5 [Kri63] . In this paper, we focus on quantitative, as opposed to qualitative effects. In particular, two ordinals are defined for each Kripke structure M . The first ordinal is called the distinguishing ordinal. This is the least ordinal y such that whenever s and t are states of M that are represented by the same modal worlds of length y , then for every ordinal 1, the modal worlds of length A that represent s and t are the same. It is easy to see that such an ordinal y exists. The second ordinal is called the uniqueness ordinal. This is the least ordinal p such that for each state s of M , the modal world of length p that represents state s of M characterizes the agents' beliefs (that is, there is only one way to extend this modal world to higher levels). It is shown thatp exists, andp 5 y + o. A complete characterization is given, as a function of the size of the Kripke structure M , as to which infinite ordinals can be the distinguishing ordinal of M , and which infinite ordinals can be the uniqueness ordinal of M . We consider these issues also in the case of the modal logic S5, where, as we mentioned, the graph of the Kripke structure represents an equivalence relation. (If there are no restrictions on the graph, then this corresponds to the modal logic K . In this paper, for simplicity we will deal only with the cases of the modal logics K and S5.) For uniqueness ordinals, the situation is different in the S5 case than in the K case.
We exploit our results on uniqueness ordinals to give several equivalent conditions for what it means to say that the agents' beliefs, as given by a modal world, have a "countable description", or putting it another way, have a "countable amount of information". One of these conditions says that the modal world represents the beliefs of the agents at a state of a countable Kripke structure. The beliefs with a countable description play a role analogous to that of Borel sets in descriptive set theory. This is because, intuitively, Borel sets are sets with a "countable description". When the modal world f has a countable description, we can further refine our definitions to give us a countable ordinal, called the descriptive ordinal o f f . We show that every countable ordinal IS the descriptive ordinal of some modal world. Although what we are most interested in is the countable case, it turns out that all of our results carry over with almost no extra work to arbitrary cardinalities. Therefore, we state and prove our results in this slightly greater generality. For example, we associate with every modal world f a descriptive cardinal, which, intuitively, is the least cardinal K such that f has a description of size at most K , or putting it another way, has an "amount of information" given by K. One of these conditions says that the modal world represents the beliefs of the agents at a state of a Kripke structure with at most K states.
The author feels that the paradigm of considering quantitative aspects of modal logic represents an interesting direction, where a great deal of research remains to be done. There are some papers (for example, [Fin72] , [FC83] , [Hoe92] ) where the modal language is enriched in order to reason explicitly about quantitative issues; in particular, in the enriched language it is possible to say "There are at least k possible worlds where the formula cp is true". In this paper, we do not enrich the language in this manner; instead, our quantitative analysis takes place "outside".
Some of the ideas in this paper were considered independently by Heifetz and Samet [HS93] . In particular, as we shall discuss later, one of our theorems follows from their results.
We now mention an example, due to Parikh [Par92], where, just as in this paper, infinite ordinals arise in connection with epistemic logic. Let g be some computable well-founded function (well-founded means that there is no infinite chain XI, x2, . . . such that g(x,+l) = x, for all n ) . Consider a situation where there are two agents, Alice and Bob, who are told that for some number n, Alice has either n or g(n) written on her forehead, and Bob has the other number written on his forehead. Each agent can see the number written on the other person's forehead, but not the number written on her/his own. Alice and Bob are alternately asked repeatedly if she/he knows the number written on her/his forehead. (As Parikh points out, this sort of problem has been considered by others, for example [Lit53] 
, [EGSSO]).
Parikh shows that the ordinal number of a round where someone can answer positively may be greater than o. In fact, he shows the following. For every computable well-founded function g, the ordinal associated with g (the ordinal number of a round where someone can answer positively) is a recursive ordinal, and for every recursive ordinal, there is a computable well-founded function g associated with that ordinal. (For a discussion on recursive ordinals, see Rogers
In 52, we define both Kripke structures and modal worlds. We define a very rich propositional modal logic, in which we allow infinitely long conjunctions. and give our semantics. We discuss various relationships between Kripke structures and modal worlds. In particular, we explain what it means for a modal world f to represent a state s of a Kripke structure M : intuitively, the beliefs of the agents, as described by f , are those at state s of M .
In 53, we consider satisfiability. In particular, we give sufficient conditions for a countable set of formulas to be satisfiable in a countable Kripke structure.
In 54, we give several characterizations for what it means for state s of Kripke structure M and a state s' of Kripke structure M to be indistinguishable. Intuitively, two states are indistinguishable if they have the same state of nature and if every agent has precisely the same "view" in both states (where the view of an agent encompasses his beliefs about nature. his beliefs about the agents' beliefs, and so on, not only through every finite level of belief. but even through all the ordinals). We define the distinguishing ordinal of a Kripke structure M to be the least ordinal y such that whenever s and t are states of M that are represented by the same y-world, then s and t are indistinguishable. We show that every countable Kripke structure has a countable distinguishing ordinal and that every countable ordinal is the distinguishing ordinal of some countable Kripke structure. The fact that every countable ordinal is the distinguishing ordinal of some countable Kripke structure follows from a construction of Heifetz and Samet [HS93] that they obtained independently. We define aJlabby Kripke structure to be one where two distinct states are indistinguishable. We generalize a result of Segerberg [Seg71] by showing that we can restrict our attention to nonflabby Kripke structures without loss of generality.
In $5, we define the uniqueness ordinal of a Kripke structure M to be the least ordinal p such that for each state s of M , the modal world of length p that represents state s of M characterizes the agents' beliefs. We show that the uniqueness ordinal exists, is countable in the case of a countable Kripke structure, and that every countable ordinal greater than 1 is the uniqueness ordinal of a countable Kripke structure. The S5 case is different from the K case. For example, in the S5 case with at least two agents, the uniqueness ordinal is shown to be a limit ordinal. This is an interesting interplay between qualitative (S5 versus K) and quantitative aspects of modal logic. Also in this section, we characterize the nonflabby Kripke structures with uniqueness ordinal o to be precisely those nonflabby Kripke structures with finite fanout.
In 56, we give three equivalent but different-looking conditions on a modal world f for what it means to say that the agents' beliefs, as given by f, have a countable description. The first condition says that the beliefs of the agents are [ Rog671.) those at a state of a countable Kripke structure. The second condition says that the beliefs of the agents can be described in an infinitary language where conjunctions of arbitrary countable sets of formulas are allowed. The third condition says that countably many levels of belief are sufficient to capture all of the uncertainty of the agents (along with a technical condition). In this section, we also characterize the finite case, when the agents' beliefs are those at a state of a finite Kripke structure.
In §7, we construct modal worlds and Kripke structures with various properties and use these to prove several of the rheorems in the paper.
In 58, we summarize our results and state some open problems. The results we have mentioned generalize naturally to the case where the Kripke structure is not necessarily countable and are proven in their full generality.
Kripke structures and modal worlds.
In this section, we define Kripke structures and modal worlds. We define an infinitary language and tell when a formula in the language is satisfied by a Kripke structure or a modal world. We also discuss the interrelationship between Kripke structures and modal worlds. We assume throughout this paper that there is a fixed nonempty finite set of primitive propositions and a fixed nonempty finite set d = { 1, . . . , n } of agents. However, on some occasions, we deal with the one-agent case. Also, for some results, we need to assume that there are at least two agents, and we will make this assumption explicit on those occasions.
Kripke structures.
A Kripke structure is a tuple ( S , n, XI,. . 
. , X n ) , where
S is a set of states, n ( s ) is a truth assignment to the primitive propositions for each state s E S , and X t is a binary relation on S , for each agent z . If 
Modal worlds.
We now define modal worlds. For convenience later on; we begin by defining a 0-ary world to be the empty sequence ( ). A 0th-order assignment f o is a truth assignment to the primitive propositions. We call ( f o ) a 1-ary world (since its "length" is 1). Intuitively. a 1-ary world is a description of reality. We could now define A-ary worlds (or A-worlds, for short) for arbitrary ordinals 1, by induction on A. Because the definitions are somewhat hard to understand. we proceed at a more leisurely pace; by first defining 2-worlds and 3-worlds.
A 1st-order assignment is a function ,f 1 , with domain the set d of agents, such that f l ( i ) is a set of I-worlds, for each agent i. Intuitively, . f l ( i ) represents agent i s beliefs about nature: the I-world (go) is a member of fl(i) iff agent i considers go to be a possible state of nature. A 2-world is a sequence ( f o , f l ) , where f o is a 0th-order assignment (that is, a truth assignment), and where f l is a 1st-order assignment. Intuitively. a 2-world represents a state of nature, along with each agent's beliefs about nature.
Let W2 be the set of all 2-worlds. A 2nd-order assignment is a function f 2 : @' + 2w2. Intuitively, f 2 ( i ) represents agent i's beliefs about nature along with agent i's beliefs about the agents' beliefs about nature. Thus intuitively, a 2-world (go, gl) is a member of f 2 ( i ) iff agent i believes that (g0,gl) is a possible 2-world. that is, that agent i considers it possible that simultaneously (a) go is the state of nature and (b) gl represents the agents' beliefs about nature.
We would now like to call each triple ( f o , f ' l , f 2 ) a 3-world. However. we do not consider all such triples to be "legal": we need to assume a certain consistency condition between f l and f 2 . To help understand the issue, assume that, say, f 2 ( i ) = {(go,gl), (g&gi), (g{,gf')}. Thus, the 2-ary worlds that agent i considers possible are precisely (go,gl), (g&g[), and (g{,g;). By "projecting" onto the first component, we would infer that the 1-ary worlds that agent i considers possible are precisely (go), (gh) , and (gl). But the set of 1-worlds that agent i considers possible is precisely f l (i). So our consistency condition would demand that f l (i) = {(go), (g;), (gl)}. A little more generally, our consistency condition ("extensionality") says that (go) E f l (i) iff there is a 1st-order assignment gl such
We are now ready to give an inductive definition of worlds of arbitrary ordinal length. Assume inductively that we have defined the set W). of all A-worlds. A Athorder assignment is a function f ). : d -+ 2 wi. A (A + 1)-sequence of assignments is a sequence ( f o , f l , . . . , f i . ) of length (A + l), where fa is an ath-order assignment for each a 5 A. A (A + 1)-worldf is a (A + 1)-sequence of assignments satisfying the extensionality condition that we shall give shortly. We first need some preliminary definitions. If a 5 A + 1, then the a-prejix off, denoted fie, is the a-sequence that is the restriction o f f to a (that is, the initial subsequence indexed by a) . We say that g is aprejix o f f if it is an a-prefix o f f for some a , and we say that f extends g, and f is an extension of g. In the special case where f = ( f o , f l , . . . , f i b ) is a (A + 1)-world and g = (Yo, f l , . . . ) is its A-prefix, then we will sometimes abuse notation and write f = (g, f l . ) .
The extensionality condition is as follows. Assume that 0 < (Y < A. Then g E f a ( i ) iff there is some h E fi,( i ) such that g = h,, .
If A is a limit ordinal, then a A-world is a A-sequence such that the a-prefix is an a-world, for each cx < A. For example, an w-world is an w-sequence First, we require inductively that for f = ( f o , f l , . . . , f z ) to be an S5 (A + 1)-world, every member of f~( i ) must be an S5 A-world, for every agent i. Thus, we restrict attention to S5 worlds at every level of the induction. There are two more constraints (originally defined in [FHV91] ). The first, which we call the knowledge condition, says that the actual world is one of the possibilities, for each agent. Intuitively, this corresponds to the "knowledge axiom" K,cp + cp, which says that everything that agent i knows is true. As before, let us begin by seeing what the knowledge condition says for S5 2-worlds and for S5 3-worlds. For a sequence ( f o , f l ) to be an S5 2-world, we require that (Yo) E f l ( i ) for each agent i. Intuitively, every agent considers the actual state of nature, namely f o , a possibility. Similarly, for a sequence (fo, fl, f 2 ) to be an S5 3-world, we require that ( f o , f l ) E fl(i), for each agent i. In the general case, we require of a (A + 1)-
The final consistency condition, which we call the introspection condition, says that each agent has no uncertainty about his own knowledge. Intuitively, this corresponds to the "introspection axioms" K,cp 3 K,K;cp and 1 K ; p + K;lK;cp, which say that agent i knows what he knows and knows what he doesn't know. Let us begin by seeing what the introspection condition says for S 5 3-worlds (it does not arise for S5 2-worlds). For a sequence (fo, f l , f z ) to be an S5 3-world, we require that for each agent i , if (g0,gl) E f 2 ( i ) , then gl(i) = f l ( i ) . That is, the only S5 2-worlds that agent i considers possible are those where he has exactly the same uncertainty about nature as he does in the actual world. In the general case, we require of a (A + 1)-sequence f = (fo, f l , . . . , fi,) that for every a with 1 5 a < A and every agent i , if g = (go,gl,. . has the same information according to f and g.' As we mentioned, the one-step no-information extension is defined slightly differently in the S5 case; this is to preserve the introspection condition. In the S5 case, define V: = {glf -; g}, which intuitively is the set of S5 A-worlds that agent i considers possible, according to f. Just as before, for every S5 A-world f, there is always some extension off to an S5 ' The reader might believe that f -, g iff f -+, g and g -+i f. This is true if 1 is a limit ordinal. we can express common knowledge (and common knowledge of a group of the agents). Thus, if G is a group of agents, then C~c p means "Everyone in the group G knows cp, everyone in the group G knows that everyone in the group G knows cp, everyone in the group G knows that everyone in the group G knows that everyone in the group G knows cp, . . . " . We can of course have nested occurrences of various CG'S, and still remain in _E",, .
If cp is an 5?K-formula for some 6 , then we may refer to cp as an 5?m-formula, or simply a formula. (
where p is a primitive proposition, iff p is true under the truth
The last clause captures the intuition that K,cp means that cp holds in every world that agent i considers possible. Before we can define the semantics for modal worlds, we need to define the depth of a formula cp, denoted depth(cp), which roughly corresponds to the depth of nesting of the K, operators.
(1) depth(true) = 0. We now define the satisfaction relation between worlds and formulas. Unlike the situation with Kripke structures, the satisfaction relation is a partial relation. We now consider the inductive step. Assume that A > 1, and that the formulas q, have been defined for every A'-world h, where A' < I . To define of for a A-world f, there are two cases, depending on whether I is a successor ordinal or a limit ordinal. Assume first that A is a successor ordinal v + 1, and that
For each agent i , define t i to be the formula Intuitively, zi says that agent i considers possible precisely those worlds in f " ( i ) .
Define or to be o ( f o )
A A { r i l i is an agent).
If A is a limit ordinal and f is a A-world, then define of to be /\{q,lh is a proper prefix off}.
It is straightforward to show the conclusion of the proposition, by induction on I .
In the special case where I is finite, Proposition 2.2 was proven in [FV85] . In this special case, the formulas of are essentially the normal forms in [Fin75]. 
Relationship between
We define the A-canonical S5 Kripke structure similarly. Here, we take the set S of states to consist of all S5 2-worlds.
Furthermore, iff and f' are S5 A-worlds, then (f, f') E X, iff f -i f'.
The next proposition (which is again a simple variation of a proposition in [FHV91] ) says that each state of a A-canonical Kripke structure represents itself. PROPOSITION 2. 6 . Let f be a ,?-world (resp., S 5 A-world), and let M be the Acanonical Kripke structure (resp., A-canonical S 5 Kripke structure). The A-world that represents the state f of M is f.
In particular, every modal world (resp., S5 modal world) represents a state of some Kripke structure (resp., S5 Kripke structure).
Later, in Propositions 7.4 and 7.5, we prove results closely related to Proposition 2.6, where we deal with generalizations of the A-canonical Kripke structure. §3. Satisfiability. There are two ways that we could define what it means for a formula to be "satisfiable". We could say that it is satisfiable if it is satisfied at a state of a Kripke structure M (in which case we say that it is satisfiable in M ) , or we could say that it is satisfiable if it is satisfied in a modal world f . The next proposition says that the notions are equivalent. Furthermore, the next proposition says that this equivalence holds also in the S5 case.
PROPOSITION 3.1. A formula is satisjiuble in a Kripke structure (resp., in an S5 Kripke structure) i f it is satisfiable in a modal world (resp., in an S5 modal world). PROOF. Assume that cp is satisfiable in a Kripke structure. Then ( M , s) I= cp for some Kripke structure M and some state s of cp. Let the depth of cp be a, and let f be the a-world that represents the state s of M . By Proposition 2.5, we see that f k 'p, so 'p is satisfiable in a modal world. By Proposition 2.4, if M is an S5 Kripke structure, then f is an S5 modal world.
Conversely, assume that 'p is satisfiable in a A-world (resp., S5 1-world) f. Let M be the ,?-canonical Kripke structure (resp., the A-canonical S5 Kripke structure). By Proposition 2.6, we know that f represents the state f of M , and by Proposition 2.5 again, it follows that (M,f) k 'p. So cp is satisfiable in a Kripke structure (resp.,
We now consider sufficient conditions for a formula to be satisfiable in a Kripke structure of size at most n. Here as in the rest of this paper, we are most interested in satisfiability in a countable Kripke structure. The next theorem will be useful later. We also give corollaries that will not be used later, but that are interesting in their own right. THEOREM 3.
Every -Y,+-formula that is satisjiable (resp., satisjiable in an S5
Kripke structure) is satisfiable in a Kripke structure (resp., S5 Kripke structure) of size at most n.
PROOF.
There is a well-known technique for associating Kripke structures (with state set S ) with relational structures (with universe S ) . (See any standard textbook on logic, such as Enderton [End72], for a discussion on relational structures, which are usually called simply structures.) As before, let 0 be the set of primitive propositions, and let s t = { 1,. . . , n } be the set of agents. For the relational structures, the vocabulary V consists of one binary relation symbol L; for each agent i E d , and one unary relation symbol Up for each primitive proposition p E 0. We can then define a one-to-one correspondence between Kripke structures with the set @ of primitive propositions and the set d = { 1, . . . , n } of agents, and relational structures with the vocabulary V . For each Kripke structure M = ( S , n, 3 1 , . . . , Zn), the corresponding relational structure R M over the vocabulary V is obtained by taking the universe of the relational structure to be the set S of states, taking the interpretation of L, to be Z j , and taking the interpretation of Up to be the set of states s such that p is true under the truth assignment n ( s ) .
For each of our ZK+-formulas cp. we define a corresponding formula cp*, with one free variable x, in the infinitary language L,+, (see [Dic85] for a discussion of LKt,; intuitively, it consists of infinitary formulas that differ from first-order formulas by allowing conjunctions of arbitrary sets of formulas of size at most K ) . In the countable case, when K = No, we are dealing with the important infinitary language L,,,. The correspondence is as follows.
S5 Kripke structure).
(1) p' = Up (x) if p is a primitive proposition.
(2) (-cp)* = 'cp*.
( 3 ) (A@* = A{vl*lw E A}-
, where y is a variable that does not appear It is straightforward to show, by induction on formulas, that ( M , s ) I= cp iff R M k cp*(x/s), where cp*(x/s) is the result of interpreting the variable x in cp* by s. In particular, cp is satisfiable in a Kripke structure iff cp* is satisfiable in a relational structure.
Assume now that cp is a satisfiable -YK+-formula. We must show that cp is satisfiable in a Kripke structure of size at most K . By our comments above, we know that cp* is satisfiable in a relational structure. By the Downwards Lowenheim-Skolem Theorem for L,+, (see, for example, [Dic85, Corollary 3.1.4, p. 3401, where we take advantage of the fact that K ' is a regular cardinal), it follows that cp* is satisfiable in a relational structure with a universe of size at most K . By our correspondence, this relational structure is R M for some Kripke structure M . Since RM has a universe of size at most K , it follows that M has at most K states. We know that R M I= cp*(x/s) for some s in the universe of R'. So ( M , s ) k cp. Hence, cp is satisfiable in a Kripke structure of size at most K , as desired.
As for the S5 case, we now show that there is a first-order formula E in the vocabulary V that "says" that the relational structure corresponds to an S5 Kripke structure. Thus. for each agent i, let E , be the first-order formula
Let E be the conjunction of the formulas E , over all agents i. If cp is an 2&+-formula that is satisfiable in an S5 Kripke structure, then cp* A E is satisfiable in a relational structure. Hence, as before. cp* A E is satisfiable in a relational structure R M with a universe of size at most K . Since RM satisfies E , it follows that M is an S5 Kripke structure. As before, M is of size at most K . Hence, cp is satisfiable in We now discuss an important special case of Theorem 3.2. For the purposes of this section only, let us consider finitary propositional modal logic, extended by common knowledge (and common knowledge of groups of agents). ByJinitary, we mean that we consider formulas only of finite length. Thus, define -Yc-formulas to be the smallest set F such that:
an S5 Kripke structure of size at most K , as desired.
(1) true is in F .
(4) If cp1 and 9 2 are in F , then 9 1 A 9 2 is in F .
If cp is in F and G is a nonempty set of agents, then C~c p is in F . Note that we are allowing only finite conjunctions. The semantics are as in 52.3, where in addition, in the case of a formula CGV, we say
Define a set C of formulas to be satisfiable in Kripke structure A4 if there is a state s of M such that ( M , s ) k cp for every formula cp E C. A set of formulas is said to be satisfiable if it is satisfiable in some Kripke structure M .
It is easy to see (as we mentioned earlier) that every LZc-formula is equivalent to an LYw,-formula. So every countable set of _E"c-formulas is equivalent to a countable conjunction of Yw, -formulas, which is itself an LYw, -formula. Therefore Another useful modal operator, besides the CG operator, is the distributed knowledge operator D G , which was introduced in [HM90] , where distributed knowledge was called implicit knowledge. Intuitively, a group G has distributed knowledge of a fact cp if the knowledge of cp is distributed among its members, so that by pooling their knowledge together the members of the group can deduce cp, even though it may be the case that no member of the group individually knows cp. 
Unlike the situation with CG, it is not hard to show that there is no LYmformula that is equivalent to D G P , even when cp is a primitive proposition. We can, however, obtain the result analogous to Corollary 3.3 for BCD-formulas instead of just BC-formulas. The reason, intuitively, is that we can obtain a first-order formula corresponding to D~c p , as in the proof of Theorem 3.2, by letting
, where y is a variable that does not appear in p*.
We then proceed more or less as in the proof of Theorem 3.2. The simple details are left to the reader. We obtain COROLLARY 3. 4 . Every countable set of YcD-formulas that is satisfiable (resp., satisfiable in an S5 Kripke structure) is satisfable in a countable Kripke structure (resp., countable S5 Kripke structure).
We can, of course, obtain a sweeping generalization of Corollary 3.4 to an even richer language by working not with languages over Kripke structures, but working directly with L,,, over the relational structure R M that appear in the proof of Theorem 3.2.
We will not consider -YCD-formulas anymore. Throughout the rest of this paper, whenever we say "formula", we mean Y m -formula. 
By Proposition 2.5 again, it follows that (M', s')
A be arbitrary, let f be the A-world that represents ( M , s ) , and let f' be the A- Let A4 be a Kripke structure, and let s be a state of M . Define the distinguishing ordinal of ( M , s) (or just the distinguishing ordinal of s, if M is understood), to be the least ordinal y such that for every state t distinguishable from s, the yworld that represents s is different from the y-world that represents t . By our conventions, if no state is distinguishable from s, then y = 0. The distinguishing ordinal of M is defined to be the sup of the distinguishing ordinals of its states. So the distinguishing ordinal of M is the least ordinal y such that whenever s and t are states of M that are represented by the same y-world, then s and t are indistinguishable. In other words, if s and t are represented by the same y-world, then s and t are represented by the same A-world for every A. It is possible to view the distinguishing ordinal as an example of Moschovakis'
closure ordinal [Mos74] in induction on abstract structures. Let r be a monotone operator that maps subsets of some set A onto subsets of A . By monotone, we
Then the closure ordinal of r is the least ordinal 6 such that BJ = Bp. Intuitively, for both our distinguishing ordinal and Moschovakis' closure ordinal, this ordinal is the least ordinal A where "nothing changes" after level A.
We would now like to characterize those ordinals that can serve as the distinguishing ordinal of a Kripke structure, as a function of the size of the structure. The next proposition will be a useful tool. An initial set of ordinals is a set of . . , X n ) . As before, let us denote the ( a + 1)-world that represents s (resp., s') by ( f (s, f f , . . . , f i ) (resp., (fg', f f', . . . , f i)). Since s and s' are represented by the same A-world and since A is not a distinguishing ordinal of a state of M , it follows that f = f j'. We also know that there is some agent i such that f ( i ) # f i (i). By reversing the roles of s and s' if necessary, we can assume that there is a world w in f : ( i ) but not in f (i). Since w E f : ( i ) , it follows from Proposition 2.3 that there is a state t such that (s, t ) E X I , and w represents t . Since w E f i ( i ) and since a 2 2, it follows from the extensionality condition in the definition of worlds that w<i E f ; ( i ) . Since f = f if, it follows that w<). E f ; ' ( i ) . So by Proposition 2.3, there is a state t' such that (s', t') E Z,, and w ,~ represents t'. Also, since w represents t , it follows that W<I. represents t . Since t and t' are represented by the same A-world (namely, w~I , ) , it follows by minimality of = a + 1 that t and t' are represented by the same a-world.
This a-world is necessarily w, since w represents t . Since (s', t') E .Zt and w is an a-world that represents t', it follows by construction that w E f i ( i ) . But this is a contradiction. The next theorem characterizes those ordinals that can arise as the distinguishing ordinal of some finite Kripke structure. THEOREM 4.3. An ordinal y is the distinguishing ordinal of some finite Kripke structure (resp. finite S5 Kripke structure) i f f y is a nonnegative integer. Let To prove the converse. we might hope that we could simply mimic the proof of Theorem 4.3, and take M to be the y-canonical S5 Kripke structure. It is true that the distinguishing ordinal of M is indeed y . However, the cardinality of M is of Recall that in Parikh's framework, where numbers are written on agents' foreheads, only recursive ordinals can arise (the recursive ordinals are an initial set of ordinals that are a proper subset of the countable ordinals). A priori, we might have guessed that no countable S5 Kripke structure could be so complicated that its distinguishing ordinal would be nonrecursive (or for that matter, larger than, say, 02).
PROOF.
The fact that if y is an infinite ordinal, then there is an S5 Kripke structure of size at most Iy I with distinguishing ordinal y follows from a construction of Heifetz and Samet [HS93] that they obtained independently. Fagin and Vardi [FV85] note that a disadvantage of Kripke structures is that they can be "flabby". One way to capture the idea that they were trying to convey is by the following definition. Let us say that a Kripke structure ( S , n, 3 1 , is flabby if there are two states s, s' E S such that s # s' and s and s' are indistinguishable. That is, M is flabby precisely if it has two distinct states that are straightforward way that y is the distinguishing ordinal of M .
size bigger than 1yI. We defer the proof of the converse to $7. PROOF. As with Segerberg's result that we just mentioned, this proposition can be proven easily in the K case (as opposed to the S5 case) by a filtration argument (see [HC84, p. 1361 ). For the sake of completeness, we give the proof here in both the K case and the S5 case.
Assume that M = ( S , n , X l , . . 
. , X n ) . We now construct
states. The construction is slightly different in the K case and the S5 case, so we consider the two cases separately.
We begin with the S5 case, which is a little more complicated, and then describe how to modify the proof for the K case. We now show, by backwards induction on j with 1 5 j 5 k -1 that w E f 2 (i).
For the base case, we see that since w represents t = s; and (sk-1,si) E x,, it follows that w E f:-'(i).
Assume inductively that w E f2+'(i). , [s] ). The base case, where the length of u is 1, is as before. We now prove the inductive step. As before, we must show that f i ( i ) = f k l ( i ) . The proof that world (resp., S5 A-world) f has at least one extension to a (A + 1)-world (resp., S5 (A + 1)-world), namely, the one-step no-information extension (resp., onestep S5 no-information extension) of f. In some cases. there is precisely one extension o f f to a ( 2 + 1)-world (resp. S5 (A + 1)-world) ( f 0, f 1,. . . , f ) . ) . which of course must be the one-step no-information extension (resp. one-step S5 noinformation extension). In this case, since f j . is uniquely determined, we say, following [FGHV92] , that f characterizes the agents' A-beliefi (resp., 2-knowledge).2 It is possible that not only is the "next" level A uniquely determined. but every level is uniquely determined. Again following [FGHV92] , we say that the 2-world (resp., S5 2-world) f characterizes the agents' beliefs (resp. characterizes the agents' knowledge) if it has a unique extension to every level, that is, for every B > A.
there is a unique 6-world (resp., S5 6'-world) that extends f. Similarly, if the 0-world g is an extension o f f , then we say g is uniquely determined by f if g is the unique 6-world that extends f.
Let M be a Kripke structure with distinguishing ordinal y , and let s be a state of M . Let f be the y-world that represents s. This theorem follows from the next theorem, which provides us additional information that we shall make use of shortly. In the next theorem, note that y + o is the least limit ordinal greater than y . M = ( S , x,3?1,. . . ,Xn) . We shall show, by induction on ordinals 2 2 y + 0 , that whenever f is a A-world that represents a state s of M , then g for some A-world g and some agent i , then g represents a state t This is sufficient to prove the theorem, since from the fact that (2) holds for every A 2 y + w, it follows easily by induction on A 2 y + w that iff is a ( y + w)-world that represents a state of M , then for every A 2 y + w there is a unique A-world that extends f.
PROOF. Assume
Before we begin the induction, we first show that (1) holds whenever A 2 y + w is a limit ordinal. Assume that f -+i g. Write f = (fo, f l , . . . ). Then g 4 E f o (i) for every 0 with 1 5 6' < A. By Proposition 2.3, it follows that every g,e represents a state so of M , where ( s , s~) E 2,. Now every g,e where y 5 6' < A has the same y-prefix, namely, g,-. So by definition of y , it follows that the states so are indistinguishable, for y 5 8 < A. Therefore, every proper prefix of g represents sg.
Since g is a A-world, with A a limit ordinal, it follows that g represents sy. So (1) holds whenever A 2 y + w is a limit ordinal.
We now show that (1) We can now proceed with the induction. The base case 1 = y + w holds: (1) holds, since y + w is a limit ordinal, and (2) holds, since (1) implies (2). For the inductive step, we need only show that (1) holds whenever A is a successor ordinal, since we already showed that (1) holds when A is a limit ordinal, and we already showed that (1) implies (2). Assume that A = v + 1. Let f be a A-world that represents a state s of M . Assume that f -ti g for some A-world g and some agent i. Then f,, -ti g<,. So by inductive assumption, g,, represents a state t of A4 where (s, t ) E Xi. By inductive assumption, g, , characterizes the agents' v-belief, that is, g,, has a unique extension to the next level of belief. But g is such an extension. Since the unique extension of g,, is g, and since g,, represents the Let M be a Kripke structure. Guided by Theorem 5.1, we define the uniqueness ordinal of M to be the sup of the uniqueness ordinals of its states. Thus, the uniqueness ordinal of M is the least ordinal , u such that for each state s of M , the modal world f of length ,u that represents state s of M characterizes the agents' beliefs (that is, there is only one way to extend f to higher levels).
The uniqueness ordinal of a Kripke structure is closely related to the Scott height of a relational structure [Nad85, p. 2861. Intuitively, the Scott height of a relational structure A is the least ordinal a such that whenever k is an integer, and two k-tuples of points in A% agree on infinitary formulas of depth a , then they state t of M , so does g. This completes the proof.
agree on infinitary formulas of arbitrary depth. In the correspondence between Kripke structures M and relational structures R M that we saw in the proof of Theorem 3.2. it is straightforward to see that the Scott height of R M is an upper bound on the uniqueness ordinal of M .
The theory of the uniqueness ordinal is different in the S5 case and the K case. We consider first the K case; where we work with unrestricted Kripke structures. As we did with the distinguishing ordinal, we shall characterize the possible values of the uniqueness ordinal as a function of the size of the Kripke structure. We consider first the finite case. Here we make use of two lemmas. In the second lemma. for convenience. we restrict our attention to the case of only one agent. since this is all we need in our construction.
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LEMMA 5. 4 . Let 
PROOF. Let p be the uniqueness ordinal of ( M , s ) . By Lemma 5.4, we know
that p 2 p' + 1. We now show that p 5 p' + 1, sop = p' + 1. Let f' be the p'-world that represents (MI, s'), and let f be thep' + I-world that represents ( M , s ) We show, by induction on k 2 1, that f < k has more than one extension. This is sufficient to prove that the uniqueness ordinalp of M is not finite, so sincep 5 o. it follows that p = w. For the base case k = 1, we already showed that there is always more than one way to extend a I-world to a 2-world. Assume inductively that f < k has more than one extension to a ( k + 1)-world. One such extension is f<k+l: let g be a different extension. which exists by assumption. Define h = (ho, hl, by letting h,, = f,,, for 0 5 m 5 k and hk+l(l) = {f,k+l,g}. Since g is an extension of f < k , it follows easily that h is a (k + 2)-world that extends f < k + l .
Another extension is f < k + 2 , which is different from h, since f k + l ( 1 ) is a singleton, whereas hk+l(l) contains two distinct members. This completes the induction and the casep = o. We first show that the uniqueness ordinal of ( M p , s1) is 2. By our earlier comments, it is at least 2. Let f = (fo, f1) be the 2-world that represents ( M p , SI). Then So the uniqueness ordinal of ( M p , s l ) is at most 2. and is therefore, exactly 2. Inductively on k , assume that we have shown that the uniqueness ordinal of ( M p , sk) is k + 1, for 1 5 k < p -1. Now the uniqueness ordinal of ( M h , s k + l ) is the same as the uniqueness ordinal of (,+Ik+*, s k + l ) , since it is easy to see that (MP,sk+l) and ( L W~+~, S~+~) are indistinguishable. Identically, the uniqueness ordinal of ( M p , s k ) is the same as the uniqueness ordinal and hence, p 5 p' + 1.
of ( M k + ' , & ) . By Lemma 5.5, the uniqueness ordinal of ( M k f 2 , s k + l ) is one more than the uniqueness ordinal of (Mkfl,sk), which (as we just noted) equals the uniqueness ordinal of (M",sk), which by inductive assumption is k . So the uniqueness ordinal of ( M k + 2 , s k + l ) is k + 1, and hence, the uniqueness ordinal of The next theorem generalizes Theorem 5. 6 by giving a larger class of Kripke structures with uniqueness ordinal at most o. SpecificaIly, the theorem says that if M is a Kripke structure with finite fanout, then M has uniqueness ordina1 at most o. What about the converse? It is easy to see that there is a flabby Kripke structure with infinite fanout but with uniqueness ordinal at most w (in fact, with uniqueness ordinal 2). However, the next theorem tells us that if we restrict our attention to nonflabby Kripke structures N , then M has uniqueness ordina1 at most w iff M has finite fanout.
THEOREM 
By extensionality, there is some w-worId h that extends g<k such that h E f c o ( t ) .
We now show that h = g. If We now obtain a contradiction by showing that there are at least two distinct (o + 1)-worlds that extend f . One such extension is the one-step no-information extension (f, f c o ) . Now f -+i g, because for every positive integer k, we know that g<k represents a state in U;, and so g<k E fk(i) by Proposition 2.3. Since f 4; g, it follows by definition of the one-step no-information extension that g E f(o(i).
Similarly, Vi 5 f,(i). Define f; The final tool we shall need in this section is a theorem (a generalization of a theorem in [FGHV92] ) that gives a necessary and sufficient condition for an w-world to characterize the agents' beliefs. We shall state the theorem in more generality than we need here, since we shall make use of it again later. Let f and g be A-worlds. We say that g is reachable from f if there are A-worlds ho, . . . , h, such that f = ho, g = h,, and for all j < r, we have hi 4; h,+l for some agent i. In the S5 case, we replace "L;" by "N;' '. THEOREM 5.10. A A-world (resp., S5 A-world) f characterizes the agents' beliefs (resp., knowledge) zflevery A-world (resp., S5 A-world) reachable from f characterizes the agents' A-beliefs (resp., A-knowledge).
This theorem was proven in [FGHV92] in the S5 case and when A = w , but essentially the same proof shows the more general result. We can now prove Theorem 5.7.
PROOF OF THEOREM 5.7. Let M be a Kripke structure with finite fanout. Let f be the w-world that characterizes state s of M , and let g be an w-world reachable from f. By applying Lemma 5.8 repeatedly, we see that g represents a state of M . By Lemma 5.9, it follows that g characterizes the agents' w-beliefs. Since g is an arbitrary o-world reachable from f, it follows from Theorem 5.10 that f characterizes the agents' beliefs.
Conversely In the countable case, Theorem 5.1 1 tells us that every countable Kripke structure has a countable uniqueness ordinal and that every countable ordinal greater than 1 is the uniqueness ordinal of a countable Kripke structure.
Our earlier Theorem 4.4 tells us that for every countable ordinal y , there is not just a countable Kripke structure, but a countable S5 Kripke structure, with distinguishing ordinal y . However, the situation with the uniqueness ordinal is different from that with the distinguishing ordinal. In particular, if p 2 2 is a countable ordinal, then although Theorem 5.11 tells us that there is a countable Kripke structure with uniqueness ordinal p , we shall see shortly that unless p is a limit ordinal, there is no S 5 Kripke structure with uniqueness ordinal p.
As an interesting application of our results. we now show that every modal world has an extension that characterizes the agents' beliefs. Let f be a A-world. By Proposition 2.6, we see that f represents a state of the A-canonical Kripke structure M . By Theorem 5.1, this state has a uniqueness ordinal. Therefore, f has an extension that characterizes the agents' beliefs. In fact, the theorems of this section give us information about how big this extension has to be. It is easy to see that the distinguishing ordinal of the A-canonical Kripke structure is A. By Theorem 5.3, the uniqueness ordinal is at most 2 + o. Therefore, we obtain the following result.
THEOREM 5.12. Let f be a A-world. There is a ( A + w)-world that extends f and that characterizes the agents' beliefs.
5.2. The S5 case. As we shall see in this section, when we restrict our attention to S5 Kripke structures and S5 modal worlds, the theory of uniqueness ordinals is somewhat different. Let M be an S5 Kripke structure, and let s be a state of M . There is more than one type of uniqueness ordinal that we might consider in the S5 case. Recall that the uniqueness ordinal of s is the least ordinal p such that if f is the p-world that represents s, then f characterizes the agents' beliefs (that is, for every ordinal 8 > p , there is a unique @-world that extends f). By contrast, define the S5 uniqueness ordinal of s to be the least ordinal p* such that if f is the p*-world that represents s, then f characterizes the agents' knowledge (that is, for every ordinal 8 > p * , there is a unique S5 @-world that extends f). It follows immediately from the existence of the uniqueness ordinal (Theorem 5.1) that the S5 uniqueness ordinal of s exists and is bounded above by the uniqueness ordinal of s. If there is only one agent, then it is easy to see that the first two levels ( J o , f 1) The proof of the converse appears in 57.
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of an S5 world characterize the agent's knowledge. It follows easily that if there is only one agent in an S5 Kripke structure, then the S5 uniqueness ordinal of each state is always 2. Since as we shall see, the uniqueness ordinal of each state in an S5 Kripke structure is always a limit ordinal. it 4 . we know that if world f represents state s, then f is an S5 world. Therefore, it is straightforward to see that the claim implies that the S5 uniqueness ordinal of s is at least as big as the uniqueness ordinal of s. But as we noted, it is clear from the definitions that the S5 uniqueness ordinal of s is no bigger than the uniqueness ordinal of s. This implies the theorem.
So we need only prove the claim. We shall prove the claim by induction on A.
There are three cases. Thus, the S5 uniqueness ordinal coincides with the uniqueness ordinal when there are at least two agents. Since also the S5 uniqueness ordinal is always 2 when there is only one agent, we shall not consider the S 5 uniqueness ordinal anymore, and shall focus only on the uniqueness ordinal.
The M is an S5 Kripke structure. As we have seen (in Theorems 5.6 and 5.11), the uniqueness ordinal of s is at least 2. Assume that the uniqueness ordinal of s were a successor ordinal p . By Lemma 5.4, the uniqueness ordinal of s would be at least p + 1, a contradiction. So the uniqueness ordinal of s is a limit ordinal.
Note that the only special feature of S5 Kripke structures that we took advantage of in proving Theorem 5.14 is that the X j relations are reflexive. Furthermore, the theorem (and proof) does not require an assumption that there be at least two agents. This complete the proof of the claim, and hence of the theorem.
PROOF.
Let us consider first the case where y is not a limit ordinal. Then as we noted earlier, the least limit ordinal greater than y is y + o. By Theorem 5.14, p is a limit ordinal. Since also y 5 p (by Theorem 5.3), it follows that p = y + o.
Assume now that y is a limit ordinal. From the fact that p is a limit ordinal and that y 5 p 5 y + o. it follows easily that either p = y or p = y + w .
We now show that both possibilities in part 2 of Theorem 5.15 can occur, even when y = o. We first give an example of an S5 Kripke structure M where p = y = w. By Theorem 4.3, for each positive integer k , there is a finite S5 Kripke structure Mk with distinguishing ordinal k . Let M be the disjoint union of {Mkll 5 k < w } .~ Clearly the distinguishing ordinal of M is o. Since M has finite fanout, it follows from Theorem 5.7 that M has uniqueness ordinal u.
We now give an example of an S5 Kripke structure M where y = w and Case 2. Assume now that p is not of the form 2 + o. Let A = {A + wlA < p } . Sincep is a limit ordinal but not of the form A + o, it is easy to see that p = sup A.
By Case 1, we know that for every 0 E A, there is an S5 Kripke structure ME with uniqueness ordinal 0. Let A4 be the disjoint union of the MO'S for 0 E A. It is In the countable case, Theorem 5.17 tells us that the uniqueness ordinal of every countable S5 Kripke structure is a countable limit ordinal, and that every countable limit ordinal is the uniqueness ordinal of a countable S 5 Kripke structure.
The next result is entirely analogous to Theorem 5.12, and is proven in the same way. clear that the uniqueness ordinal of M is supA = p. ' In order to take the disjoint union, there must be the same set of agents and the same set of primitive propositions. We assume in this paper that these sets are fixed. In fact, all of our constructions go through with two agents and one primitive proposition, It is straightforward to see that they can be extended to an arbitrary number n 2 2 of agents. Some constructions go through even with only one agent, and similarly, these constructions can be extended to an arbitrary number n of agents. This same comment applies everywhere in this paper that we take a disjoint union.
We have already seen that one difference between the S5 case and the K case is that in the S5 case, the uniqueness ordinal is necessarily a limit ordinal. The next theorem shows another difference. Let s and t be states of a Kripke structure M = (S, ~, 3~, . . . ,Zn) . We PROOF. Let M be a connected S5 Kripke structure. Let s and s' be states of M with uniqueness ordinals p,p', respectively. Let f be the p-world that represents s, and let f' be the p-world (not the p'-world) that represents s'. Since s has uniqueness ordinal p , it follows that f characterizes the agents' knowledge. Let W be the set of S5 p-worlds that are reachable from f. By Theorem 5.10, every member of W characterizes the agents' p-knowledge. Now W is also the set of S5 p-worlds that are reachable from f', since f' is reachable from f (because f and f' are p-worlds that represent states of the same connected Kripke structure). So by Theorem 5.10 again, f' characterizes the agents' knowledge. Therefore, p' 5 p .
Theorem 5.19 would be false if we were to drop the S5 assumption. Indeed, in a construction in the proof of Theorem 5.6, there is a finite connected Kripke structure where each state has a different uniqueness ordinal.
Similarly, p 5 p'.
The size of the description of the agents' beliefs.
In this section, we consider the size of a "description" of the agents' beliefs. Here, the S5 case is no different than the K case, so we discuss only the K case.
6.1. Three notions of the description size. Let n be an infinite cardinal. Let f be a 2-world, which is thought of as describing the agents' beliefs, where the cardinality of 2 might be bigger than K . What does it mean to say that the agents' beliefs, as given by f , have a dscription of size at most n? Putting it another way, when does f have an "amount of information" given by K? We are especially interested in the situation where K = No, so that we are considering "countable descriptions", or a "countable amount of information". We can imagine several such notions. NOTION 1. f represents a state of a Kripke structure of size at most n. Of course, in the countable case this says that f represents a state of a countable Kripke structure. Assume that the 1-world f represents the state s of Kripke structure M of size at most K . Why, intuitively, do the agents' beliefs, as given by f, have a description of size at most 6, or only K amount of information? There are two cases. Let f' be the p-prefix of f. Thus, f' characterizes the agents' beliefs. By Case 1, intuitively, f' has a description of size at most n since Ipl 5 K . The agents' beliefs, as given by f, are exactly the same as the agents' beliefs, as given by f' since f' characterizes the agents' beliefs. Therefore, the agents' beliefs, as given by f, have a description of size at most n. Looking at it another way, there is the same amount of information in f as in f'.
We now need some more definitions. Let f = (f 0, f 1 , . . . ) be a A-world, and let i be an agent. We say that a world g is i-internal to f if either g is a prefix o f f , or else g E f a ( i ) for some a with 1 5 a < A. We say that g is internal to f if there are worlds ho, . . . , h, such that
(3) for all j < r , there is an agent i such that the world hJ is i-internal to h,+l.
is of size at most n for each agent i and each 8 with 1 5 B < A. A world f is nhereditary if every world internal to f is internally of size at most n. Intuitively, a world f is &-hereditary if whenever g@ "appears inside" f, then g~( i ) has at most K. members for each agent i . In the countable case, we may say hereditarily countable for No-hereditary.
As we saw, our first notion of what it means to say that the agents' beliefs, as given by f, have a description of size at most n, is that f represents a state of a Kripke structure of size at most n. We would like to give an equivalent notion that is defined in terms of the structure o f f . That is, we would like to give a "modal world"-theoretic notion, as opposed to a "Kripke structure"-theoretic notion. One candidate for such a notion is "f is n-hereditary". The next proposition says that this condition is necessary but not sufficient. Later, we shall define a condition on f that is both necessary and sufficient.
PROPOSITION 6.1. Let f be a world that represents a state of a Kripke structure of size at most K . Then f is n-hereditary. However, the converse is false.
PROOF. A straightforward induction on ordinals B shows that each &world that represents a state of M is &-hereditary. The failure of the converse is shown in $7. Thus, it is shown there that there is a world that is &-hereditary, but that does not Let n be an infinite cardinal. Let us say that a world is &-small if it is nhereditary, and if its length is an ordinal of cardinality at most n. We now give our next notion of what it means to say that the beliefs of the agents, as given by f, has a description of size at most n.
NOTION 2. f is uniquely determined by some n-smallprefix off. In the countable case, this says that f is uniquely determined by some prefix that is of countable length and that is hereditarily countable. Assume that f is uniquely determined by its n-small prefix f'. Intuitively, f' has a description of size at most n (since f' is n-small), and the agents' beliefs, as given by f , are the same as the agents' beliefs, as given by f'. As we shall see, this notion turns out to be the necessary and sufficient condition on f that we promised just before Proposition 6.1.
Our final notion of a description of size at most n corresponds to a description by a formula. In particular, the p-world that represents s is n-small. Define f' to be the p-prefix o f f if the length of f is at least p , and otherwise let f' be f itself. Then f' is a n-small prefix o f f that uniquely determines f .
(2) + (3): It is straightforward to show by induction on ordinals 6 2 1 that if h is a n-small &world, then the formula Ch guaranteed by Proposition 2.2 is an SfK+ -formula.
Assume that the A-world f is uniquely determined by its n-small prefix f'. Since f' is a prefix of f, there is A' 5 1 such that f' is a A'-world. Define Xr to be afj. In $7, we give an alternate proof of (2) + (1) in Theorem 6.2 that does not depend on Theorem 3.2, and in particular, does not depend on the Downwards Lowenheim-Skolem Theorem for I,,+,.
Let us consider Theorem 6.2 in the case where K, = No, that is: the case of a "countable description". I f f is an w-world, then it clearly satisfies condition (2) of Theorem 6.2 (and hence, all of the conditions), since f itself is No-small. In particular, we obtain the nonobvious fact that every w-world f satisfies condition (1): that is, represents a state of a countable Kripke structure. Although every
structure of size at most I E , as desired. . We now show that f has descriptive ordinal p. The descriptive ordinal is at most p, since the p-prefix o f f is f, which certainly uniquely determines f and which is 6-small since it is K-hereditary by Proposition 6.1. The descriptive ordinal cannot be strictly less rn 6.3. Describable beliefs. Let us imagine a modal world with a level for every ordinal, and let us call these "total worlds". Thus, for every ordinal A, the A-prefix of a total world is a I-world, which describes beliefs of the agents up to level A. Intuitively, a total world describes the total beliefs of the agents.
We can imagine several notions of what it means to say that a total world f is "describable". z f l g = f.
following are equivalent.
( 1 ) f represents a state of a Kripke structure of size at most n.
( 2 ) f is uniquely determined by some n-small prefix off. (3) There is an -YK+-formula such that i f g is an arbitrary 1-world, then g I= xr Theorem 6.5 follows easily from Theorem 6.2, and Theorem 6.4 follows easily from Theorem 6.5.
6.4. The finite case. We have given several characterizations of when a world represents a state of a Kripke structure of size at most K , for infinite ordinals n. We now give a characterization of when a world represents a state of a finite Kripke structure.
Let us say that a world f is hereditarily bounded if there is some integer k such that the number of m-worlds internal to f is at most k for every positive integer m. It is clear that iff represents a state of a finite Kripke structure, then f is hereditarily bounded. The next theorem, which is proven in 97, says that the converse is also true. The fact that the converse holds contrasts with the situation of Proposition 6.1, where we saw that each world that represents a state of a Kripke structure of size at most n is n-hereditary but not conversely. THEOREM 6.6. A world represents a state of a finite Kripke structure i f s it is hereditarily bounded.
fj7. Constructions. In this section, we give constructions of modal worlds with certain properties. We show how to construct Kripke structures with related properties from these modal worlds. In particular, we give the constructions promised in the proofs of Theorems 4.4, 5.1 1, and the second part of Proposition 6.1, and give an alternate proof of (2) + (1) in Theorem 6.2 that does not depend on the Downwards Lowenheim-Skolem Theorem for L,+,. We also give a proof of Theorem 6. 6 .
We now give a proposition that tells us that we can extend a n-small world and still maintain the property of being n-small. Then f has an extension to a n-small I-world (resp., S5 A-world). PROOF. We shall prove the Proposition only in the S 5 case; the K case is very similar but a little simpler (since we have to worry about fewer constraints).
We prove the result when /z = I' + 1; the general result then follows by an induction on ordinals. Thus, let f = (fo, fl, . . . ) be a n-small S 5 A'-world. We shall show that f has an extension to a n-small S5 (1' + 1)-world (fo, f l ,
We prove this by induction on A' < K + , uniformly over all S5 ,?.'-worlds. The base case A' = 1 is immediate.
There are two cases, depending on whether A' is a successor ordinal or a limit ordinal. Assume first that A' is a successor ordinal v + 1. Let i be an agent. Since fv) is n-small, it follows easily that every v-world g E f ,,(i) is twsmall.
By inductive assumption, every such g has an extension to a n-small S 5 (v + 1)-world (go, ..., g,,) . Let us define a;(g) to be the S5 (v Assume now that A' is a limit ordinal. For each agent i, let Pi be the set of all worlds that are i-internal to f . Since f is n-small, it follows easily that the set P; is of cardinality at most K . It follows from the extensionality condition that for every g E Pi, there is a 1'-world bi (g) that extends g such that every prefix of bi(g) is i-internal to f . Clearly, b;(g) is n-small since f is. Define f j~, by taking fl.,(i) = {bi(g)lg E Pi} U {f} for each agent i. The set fi.l(i) is of cardinality at most K for each agent i since the set P; is of cardinality at most K for each agent i. It is easy to verify that (fo, f 1, . . . , f 1 , ) is an S5 world. From what we have said,
We now give a construction very similar to the construction of the A-canonical Kripke structure. Let A be an ordinal, and let f be a world of length at least C2 = I + o, the least limit ordinal greater than 1. We define M = (S,rc,Zl,. . . ,Z*), the I-canonical Kripke structure o f f , as follows. The set S of states consists of all A-worlds internal to f . If g and g' are A-worlds internal to f , then (g,g') E Xi iff g 4 ; g'. Finally, if g = (go,gl,. . .), then n(g) = go. I f f is an S5 world, then we it follows easily that it is n-small. define the A-canonical S5 Kripke structure off similarly. In this case. if g and g' are S5 A-worlds internal to f , then (g,g') E iff g -; g'.
The reason for our choice of R is given by the next proposition. PROPOSITION 7.2. Let R be a limit ordinal, and let f be a world of length at least (2.
(1) I f A < R and g is a A-world internal to f. then g is internal to f<n.
(2) If A' 5 A < LR and g is a A'-world internal to f. then there is a A-world internal PROOF. We shall show that if A' 5 A < LR and g is a A'-world internal to f. then there is a A-world internal to f,n that extends g. Both parts of the proposition follow easily from this (part (1) follows by taking A' = A).
So assume that A' 5 A < R and that g is a A'-world internal to f. Since g is internal to f, there are worlds ho, . . . , h, such that (a) g = ho, (b) h, is a prefix of f. and (c) for all j < r , there is an agent i such that the world hi is i-internal to h,+I. It is easy to see that we can assume without loss of generality that h, is a (A' + j)-world for 0 5 j 5 r . We show by reverse induction on j with 0 5 j 5 r that there is a (A + j)-world internal to h, that extends h,. The base case j = r is immediate. For the inductive step, let e be a (A + j + 1)-world internal to h, that extends h,+l. By assumption. there is an agent i such that h, is i-internal to h;+l. It follows easily that h, is i-internal to e. Therefore, either h, is a prefix of e = (eo, el,. . . , ej,+,). or else h, E e,(i) for some a with 1 5 cr 5 A + j. If h; is a prefix of e, then the (3, + j)-prefix of e is a (A + j)-world internal to h, that extends h;, and the inductive step is complete. If hj E ea(i) for some a. then by extensionality. there is some (A + j)-world that extends hi that is in ej~+,(i), and so is internal to h,. This completes the induction. In particular, there is a A-world internal to h,. that extends g. Since h, is assumed to be a (A' + r)-prefix o f f , it
We can use Proposition 7.2(1) to give an upper bound, independent of the length o f f , on the number of A-worlds that are internal to a n-hereditary world f. PROPOSITION 7.3. Let n be an infinite cardinal, and let A be an ordinal of cardinality at most n. Let f be a n-hereditary world. The number of A-wyorlds that are internal to f is at most n.
to f that extends g.
follows that there is a A-world internal to f<n that extends g, as desired.
PROOF. Let f be a K-hereditary 8-world. There are three cases. Case 1. B < A. Then the number of A-worlds that are internal to f is zero. Case 2. A 5 8 < A + o. An easy induction on integers k shows that for each n-hereditary world g of length A + k, the number of A-worlds that are internal to g is at most n. In particular, the number of A-worlds that are internal to f is at most n.
Case 3. A + o 5 8. By Proposition 7.2( l), all of the A-worlds internal to f are internal to f<;.+o. It is easy to see that each A-worlds internal to f<i.+o is internal to f<;.+k for some integer k. By Case 2, the number of A-worlds internal to f<).+k for some integer k is at most K . Adding these up over all integers k, we find that rn The next proposition (which is analogous to Proposition 2.6) says that each PROPOSITION 7.4. Let A be an ordinal, let f be a world (resp., S 5 world) of length the number of ?.-worlds internal to f<j,+w; and hence to f, is at most n.
state of the A-canonical Kripke structure o f f represents itself.
at least A i -w, and let M be the A-canonical Kripke structure (resp., 2-canonical S5 Kripke structure) off. Then for each A-world (resp., S5 A-world) g internal to f, the A-world that represents the state g of M is g. PROOF. We prove the proposition in the K case; the proof in the S5 case is almost identical.
Let M = ( S , z , X , , . . . ,X,,) . We show by induction on Q (with 1 5 0 5 2,) that the 8-world that represents the state g of A4 is g<O for every state g. The base step Q = 1 is immediate, by definition of 7r. For the inductive step, it is easy to see that we need only consider successor ordinals 8 = v + 1. Let ) be an arbitrary state of M (that is, an arbitrary A-world internal to f). Let g' = (g&gj,. . .) be the A-world that represents g. Let i be an arbitrary agent. We must show that gl,(i) = g:(i). We first show that gl. internal to f that extends g. Since h E g,.(i), it follows by extensionality that there is an extension e of h such that e E g;.(i). Now e is a A-world internal to f , so e is a state of M . Since e E gj,(i), it follows that (8, e) E X l . Let e' be the A-world that represents the state e. By inductive assumption, e!,,, = e<r. Since e extends the v-world h, it follows that h = e<,,. So h = e!,,. Now e!,,, E g,',(i) since (g,e) E X;.
So h E g i ( i ) , as desired. Hence, gl,(i) C gL(i).
We now show that g; ( i ) determined by some 6-small prefix off. We shall show that f represents a state of a Kripke structure of size at most n. Let f' be a n-small prefix o f f that uniquely determines f. So f' is a n-hereditary A-world for an ordinal A of cardinality at most n. By Proposition 7.1, there is an extension off' to a n-hereditary (A + a)-world f". Let M be the A-canonical Kripke structure off". Now the states of M are the A-worlds that are internal to f". Since f" is n-hereditary, it follows from Proposition 7.3 that the number of 2-worlds that are internal to f" is at most n. Hence, M has at most n states. One of these states is f'. By Proposition 7.4, the I-world that represents the state f' of M is f'. Since f is uniquely determined by f', it follows that f represents the state f' of M . So f represents a state of a Kripke structure of size at most n, as desired. The A-canonical Kripke structure and the A-canonical Kripke structure of a world f are of course variations of each other. We now define another variation, whch is useful in proving Theorem 6.6. Let ; 1 be a limit ordinal, and let f be a world of length at least A. We define M = ( S , z, 31, -. . , Z,,) , the weak A-canonical Kripke structure off, as Follows. The set S of states consists of all A-worlds g such that every proper prefix of g is internal to f. If g and g' are members of S , then
We have shown that g, = g:,. This completes the inductive step.
(g,g') E Xi iff g 4; g'. Finally . if g = (go,gl, ), then x(g) = go. I f f is an S5 world, then we define the weak A-canonical S 5 Kripke structure off similarly. In this case, if g and g' are members of S .
The next proposition, which is analogous to Proposition 2.6 and 7. 4 . is proven by a very similar argdment to that in the proof of Theorem 7.4. PROPOSITION 7.5. Each state of the weak A-canonical Kripke structure off (resp., the weak A-canonical S 5 Kripke structure of the S 5 world f) represents itseg
We now use Proposition 7.5 to prove Theorem 6.6. PROOF OF THEOREM 6.6. Let f be a A-world. We must show that f represents a state of a finite Kripke structure iff f is hereditarily bounded. We already noted that it is easy to see that iff represents a state of a finite Kripke structure, then f is hereditarily bounded. So assume that f is hereditarily bounded: we must show that f represents a state of a finite Kripke structure. If A is finite, let M be the A-canonical Kripke structure. Then M is finite: and by Proposition 2.6. the world f represents the state f of M .
So assume that A is infinite. Let f' = f<,. Let M be the weak co-canonical Kripke structure off'. Since f is hereditarily bounded, it is easy to see that M is finite. By Proposition 7.5. the world f' represents the state f' of M . Since M is finite, it of course has finite fanout. so by Theorem 5.7. the uniqueness ordinal of ilil is at most w. Therefore, since f' is the w-prefix o f f . it follows that f' uniquely determines f. Since the A-world g that represents the state f' of M is an extension off', it follows that g = f. So f represents the state f' in the finite Kripke structure w The next two theorems prove the existence of certain worlds. The first theorem (Theorem 7.6) gives us a world that we shall use to define a Kripke structure required in the proof of Theorem 5.1 1. The second theorem (Theorem 7.7) gives us a certain S5 world, that we will use to prove Proposition 6.1 and to define an S5 Kripke structure for the proof of Theorem 4.4.
Let us say that truth assignments are irrelevant in a world f if every 1-world internal to f is the same. In our constructions in the K case, including that in Theorem 5.6 and in the next theorem (which is used in proving Theorem 5.1 I), we can get away with considering Kripke structures with only one agent, and where truth assignments are irrelevant.
( 1 ) g involves only one agent, Let p 2 2 be a successor ordinal v + 1. Let g = g". We now show that g is a 1-world that satisfies the conditions of the theorem. The first two conditions are immediate from the construction. We have already shown the third condition. The fourth condition holds. since it is not hard to see that every p-world internal to an extension of g is an extension of some g',, which as we noted characterizes the agents' beliefs. As for the fifth condition, every proper prefix of g is also a prefix m REMAINDER OF PROOF OF THEOREM 5.11. Let K be an infinite cardinal. We must show that if 2 5 1 . 1 5 n , then p is the uniqueness ordinal of some Kripke structure of size at most K . Assume first that p 2 2 is a successor ordinal. Let g be the p-world guaranteed by Theorem 7.6, and let g' be the unique (p + w)-world that extends g. Let M be the p-canonical S5 Kripke structure of g'. Since g is &-hereditary, we know from Proposition 7.1 that some (p + w)-extension of g is n-hereditary. Since there is a unique such extension, namely g', we know that g' is &-hereditary. It follows from Proposition 7.3 that M has at most n states. We now show that the uniqueness ordinal of M is p.
We first show that the uniqueness ordinaI of M is at most p. Let h be a state of M . By Proposition 7.4, the p-world that represents h is h. Since h is a p-world internal to an extension of g, it follows from Theorem 7.6 that h characterizes the agents' beliefs. Hence, the uniqueness ordinal of M is at most p.
We now show that the uniqueness ordinal of M is at least p. One of the states of M is g, and by Proposition 7.4, thep-world that represents g is g. By Theorem 7.6, no proper prefix of g characterizes the agents' beliefs. So the uniqueness ordinal of the state g of A4 is at least p. Hence, the uniqueness ordinal of M is at least p.
Assume now that p is a limit ordinal. We have shown that for every successor ordinal I3 2 2, there is a Kripke structure MS with at most n states and with uniqueness ordinal 8. Let M be the disjoint union of the Ms's for I3 < p. It is easy to see that M is a Kripke structure with at most rc states and with uniqueness
The next theorem is almost the same as Theorem 7.6 except that it deals with the S5 case, which introduces extra complications in the proof. Since we are dealing with the S5 case, two agents, rather than one, are required. THEOREM 7.7. Let n be an injnite cardinal. There is a n-hereditary S 5 n'-world o f f " and so does not characterize the agents' beliefs. s u {glg E S } .
(1) The S 5 (A + 1)-world ( f o , f l , . . . , fl) is n-hereditary.
(2) f l ( i ) is symmetric. , yj.) such that y , = fa for 0 5
. ( i ) .
Clearly, conditions (1) and ( 3 ) are sufficient to prove the theorem. We now define the desired S5 n+-world ( f o , f l , ). Define fo to be p and f I (1) = fl(2) = { b), @)}. It is easy to see that the conditions hold for A = 1.
Assume inductively that each f , has been defined for a < 1 and that the conditions hold whenever we replace A by a for 1 5 a < A. We now show how to define f j , so that the conditions hold. There are two cases, depending on whether A is a successor ordinal or a limit ordinal.
Assume first that A is a successor ordinal v + 1. Let i be an agent, and let i' y . Since y is a limit ordinal, also B + 1 < y . By the argument we just gave, the distinguishing ordinal of M is at least 0 + 1. Since this is true for every 8 < y , it follows that the distinguishingordinal of M is at least y . as desired.
58.
Summary and open problems. This paper introduces various quantitative concepts into modal logic, both for Kripke structures and for modal worlds. For each Kripke structure M , we define the distinguishing ordinal of M to be the least ordinal y such that whenever s and t are states of M represented by the same modal worlds of length y . then for every ordinal 1, the modal worlds of length 1 that represent s and t are the same. We also define the uniqueness ordinal of M to be the least ordinal p such that for each state s of M , the modal world of length p that represents s characterizes the agents' beliefs. It is shown that these ordinals exist, and it is shown how they relate to each other. A complete characterization is given. as a function of the size of the Kripke structure M , as to which infinite ordinals can be the distinguishing ordinal of M and which infinite ordinals can be the uniquenss ordinal of M . For uniqueness ordinals, the situation is different in the S5 case and the K case.
In the case of modal worlds f. we quantify by giving three equivalent but different-looking characterizations of what it means to say that f has a description of size at most K (for K an infinite cardinal). The least such K is the descriptive cardinal o f f . We refine this notion. by giving an ordinal of cardinality K , called the descriptive ordinal o f f . We show that every infinite ordinal is the descriptive ordinal of some model world.
The main contribution of this paper probably does not lie in the definitions and theorems. but in advocating the idea of making modal logic quantitative and showing by example how to do so. A great deal of research in this area remains to be done. For example, we now give some open problems (some of which may not be difficult to resolve). 0 Many of the constructions in $7 are "modal-world theoretic": we construct a modal world with certain properties and use this modal world to define a Kripke structure with the desired properties. It might be interesting to define a Kripke structure with the desired properties directly. This was done by Heifetz and Samet in their construction mentioned after Theorem 4. 4 . In this paper, we have considered only two modal logics-K and SS-in the spectrum of possibilities. Because of reflexivity of the Xi relations in the S5
case. the uniqueness ordinal is forced to be a limit ordinal. What happens for other modal logics?
The most important open problem is to consider other ways to make modal logic quantitative. There are probably many interesting concepts waiting to be discovered!
